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Police Frisks†
By David S. Abrams, Hanming Fang, and Priyanka Goonetilleke*
Police “stop-and-frisks” of pedestrians and
motorists have become an increasingly controversial tactic, given low average rates of contraband discovery, incidents of abuse, and evidence
of racial disparity. Study of the tactic by economists has been much influenced by Knowles,
Persico, and Todd (2001; hereafter, KPT) who
first suggested the use of a “hit rate” (contraband
discovery rate per frisk) test to distinguish racial
prejudice from statistical discrimination in highway searches by police officers. Models used by
KPT and almost all subsequent literature (e.g.,
Anwar and Fang 2006) on the subject imply
diminishing marginal returns to frisks. That is, if
frisks decrease substantially, the rate of contraband discovery should rise, ceteris paribus.
This is the first paper to test this assumption
empirically using arguably exogenous variations in frisk rates (cf. Feigenberg and Miller
2022).1 We study the period around the nationwide protests that followed the killing of George
Floyd on May 25, 2020, after which police
frisks dropped tremendously and rapidly. Using
extremely granular data from Chicago, we find
that hit rates increased as police frisks plunged,
in line with the predictions of KPT. We present
evidence that suggests the impact was not due
to changes in police effort, the composition of
individuals on the street, police deployment, or
crime rates. In addition to testing policing models, these results should help guide policy decisions about policing by providing an estimate of
the elasticity of contraband yield with respect
to frisks. Understanding the efficacy of police

frisks to changes in frisk rates is necessary to
evaluate their utility.
I. Data

Our main dataset comes from the
Chicago Police Department and contains
suspect-stop-level data including all pedestrian
police stops within the city from January 1, 2016
to December 31, 2020, comprising 347,694
incidents.2
Figure 1 displays the number of police frisks
(black) and the firearm discovery rate of these
frisks (grey) in 2020 for Chicago. The first vertical line indicates the start of the week in which
the Chicago Police Department appears to have
changed their policy for nonviolent incidents
due to the onset of the pandemic, while the second vertical line marks the start of the decline in
police frisks following the protests in response
to the George Floyd killing. The drop in frisks
was large (49 percent) and long-lasting after the
pandemic onset, only returning to similar levels
just before the George Floyd killing. Frisks then
again dropped sharply, this time by 39 percent.
As frisks plunge, the hit rate (i.e., the firearm
discovery rate) rose sharply in June 2020. Given
the plethora of confounding factors surrounding
the pandemic onset, the changes around the protests are the focus of this paper.3
I. Main Results

Our first analysis is straightforward. We estimate the impact of a large change in police
frisks on the share of frisks that result in contraband discovery. If officers maximize the total
expected contraband findings in deciding whom
to frisk, then a large exogenous decline in the
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1
Abrams, Fang, and Goonetilleke (2022) contains a more
extensive analysis of a similar topic.

2
The dataset includes information on timing, location, ID
of the police officer conducting the stop, demographic information on the individual stopped, whether a frisk, search or
arrest occurred and whether any contraband was discovered.
3
See Section IIA for further discussion.
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Pedestrian frisks by police in Chicago
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Figure 1
Notes: This figure shows the number of frisks of pedestrians
(black) and the associated firearm hit rate (grey) in Chicago.
The red vertical line indicates the onset of the pandemic
while the green indicates the fall in frisks in response to the
George Floyd protests.
Source: Chicago Police Department (2021)

number of frisks should substantially increase
the hit rate, ceteris paribus. To test this, we run a
difference-in-difference analysis, comparing the
change in hit rate around the June 2020 protests
to the same period in prior years:
(1) Ci  = α + β1  afteri  × treati  + β2  afteri

+ ∑2020
 (θk   × yik
 )  + ∑Jj=1(δj  × sij ) 
k=2016

+ ti  + ϵi,

where i indexes individual stops (multiple individuals may be detained in a single stop, and
individuals may be stopped multiple times),
Ci is an indicator that takes value 1 if contraband
is discovered, a fteri is 1 if the frisk occurred after
May 28 regardless of year, while treati is 1 if the
frisk occurred in 2020.4 yik
  is a year dummy and
sij is a dummy for the police sector where the
frisk occurred. ti is a linear time trend.5
Columns 1 –2 of Table 1 report the results from
estimating equation (1) for pedestrian frisks.
As the legal purpose of frisks is the detection
of weapons, and firearms are the most common
4
This is the date in 2020 after which there is a rapid
decline in police frisks.
5
We do not include demographics of the suspect in our
regressions as these are characteristics that police engaging
in optimizing behavior would be expected to use to determine whom to frisk.
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form of weapons found as contraband, this is our
primary outcome. Since the bulk of contraband
does not include weapons (drugs are the most
common type), we also examine overall contraband hit rate as well. The estimated coefficients
of β1point in the expected direction—the vast
decline in frisks corresponds to an increased
hit rate. The magnitude is large, relative to the
low mean hit rates. For example, the 2.6 percentage point increase post protests in gun hit
rate is equivalent to 44.5 percent of the mean in
the prior period of 2020 (5.8 percent). The main
result is straightforward, as shown in Figure 1
and Table 1; the challenge that we address in the
rest of the paper is to rule out alternative explanations for these findings.
A. Testing for Changes in Suspect Population
A greater number of people on the streets
increases potential suspects, so if observable
characteristics are informative, officers should
have a larger pool of higher likelihood suspects
and thus a greater hit rate. Figure 2 displays
two indices from Google Community Mobility
Reports as a measure of how many individuals were on the street.6 Retail and recreation
are reported in the solid line and transit in the
dashed line. These provide a measure of foot
traffic, with a sharp, deep drop around the pandemic onset and then a slow rise beginning in
April 2020.
This evidence reinforces that any attempt to
draw inference about the decline in police frisks
from the pandemic period would be impeded
by this substantial simultaneous change. That
concern does not apply to the period around the
protests when there was a smooth but relatively
modest increase in mobility measures. While
there were certainly localized changes in the
number of potential detainees as protests or looting occurred, overall mobility patterns changed
smoothly. We further explore local variation
around the time of the protests below.

6
This data is generated from the mobile devices of
individuals who have turned on Location History for their
Google account. The daily data is aggregated to the county
level and reported relative to a baseline period, adjusted for
day of week.
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Table 1—Pedestrian Frisk Hit Rate
All stops

After × Treat

Guns only
(2)

All contraband
(3)

Guns only
(4)

−0.003
(0.008)

−0.005
(0.004)

−0.025
(0.03)

−0.034
(0.016)

18,876
0.011
0.107

18,876
0.015
0.027

2,544
0.027
0.136

2,544
0.010
0.045

0.034
(0.018)

After

Active officers

All contraband
(1)

Observations
Adjusted R2
Mean Y

0.026
(0.012)

0.038
(0.031)

0.017
(0.02)

Notes: This table reports the change in hit rate of pedestrian frisks using the difference-in-difference specification in equation
(1). In columns 1 and 2, all pedestrian frisks during the relevant period are included. In columns 3 and 4, the data is restricted
to frisks by officers who conducted at least one frisk in the three weeks before the George Floyd protests began. Hit rate is
measured as the probability of finding either (1) any contraband (drugs or weapons) or (2) specifically firearms following a
search/frisk. Data from 2016–2020 are used. Observations range from three weeks before the George Floyd protests to six
weeks after. The same calendar dates are used for all years. “After” equals 1 beginning May 29 and 0 otherwise; “Treat” equals
1 for 2020 and 0 otherwise. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects as well as a time trend. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the sector level.

Mobility change relative to baseline

Source: Chicago Police Department (2021)
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Figure 2
Notes: This figure shows the change in mobility in Chicago
over 2020 relative to a baseline established Jan. 3–Feb. 6
2020. Mobility is reported for the Retail/recreation (blue
solid line) and Transit (red dashed line) categories reported
by the Google Community Mobility Reports. The red vertical line indicates the pandemic onset while the green
indicates the fall in frisks in response to the George Floyd
protests.
Source: Google (2020)

B. Testing for Changes in Police Deployment
An important implication of the policing
models is that as an officer decreases the number
of frisks she makes, the hit rate on the marginal

frisk should increase. However, the decline in
police frisks could result from a decline in the
number of officers making frisks, a decline in
frisks per officer, or both. These could have different theoretical implications. For example, if
officers who are of lower ability in selecting suspects for frisks are the ones redeployed during
the protests, the changing composition of officers conducting frisks could increase average hit
rates across officers.
We can observe identifiers of officers making frisks. Thus, we are able to determine that
there was a decline both on the intensive margin (frisks per officer) and the extensive margin (number of officers making frisks). While
shifts in the extensive margin could have an
ambiguous impact on hit rates, declines on the
intensive margin should clearly increase hit
rates, which is what we see during the protests.
One way to isolate the impact of the change in
the intensive margin is by focusing on a subset
of active officers who conducted a frisk in the
three weeks prior to the protests. Table 1 columns 3–4 report results from these regressions,
which are similar to the main results.7 Hit rates
7
The results are robust when officer fixed effects are
included in the regressions. This further differentiates our
results from prior literature as we estimate the effects of
within-officer variation specifically.
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Table 2—Change in Crime Incidents

log of daily incident reports
All of Chicago
Subset of Chicago
Shooting
Gun crime
Shooting
Gun crime
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

After × Treat
After
Observations
Adjusted R2

0.378
(0.147)

0.074
(0.081)

0.056
(0.162)

0.053
(0.081)

0.142
(0.086)

−0.051
(0.055)

0.22
(0.113)

−0.052
(0.059)

315
0.213

315
0.144

315
0.159

315
0.176

Notes: This table shows the change in daily crime from the start of the protests using the d ifference-in-difference specification
in equation (1) with crime reports as the dependent variable. For the shooting regressions, 0.5 is added to the daily number to
account for days with zero incidents. “Gun crime” is an aggregation of crimes with UCR codes generally associated with firearms. Each column reports a separate regression. Data from 2 016–2020. In columns 1 and 2, data for the entire city is used. In
columns 3 and 4, data are used for the 8 police districts that had some of the lowest increases in shootings over this period (districts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, and 22). Observations range from three weeks before the beginning of the George Floyd protests and
six weeks after for each year. “After” equals 1 beginning May 29 and 0 otherwise; “Treat” equals 1 for 2020 and 0 otherwise.
All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported.
Source: Chicago Police Department (2020, 2021)

generally increase by a similar magnitude as
in the main s pecifications. This is an essential
result to be consistent with the policing models: as individual officers become more selective in frisks, their hit rates increase.
C. Change in Crime
While we have examined potential changes in
the size of the suspect population in Section IIA
above, it is possible that there could be a change
in criminal propensity. An increase in the share
of potential criminals in the suspect population
could drive an increase in hit rates. To investigate
this, we estimate equation (1) using daily crime
reports as the dependent variable (Table 2). This
table includes two measures of crime related to
gun carry: shootings, and a composite index of
crimes generally involving firearms.8
In Chicago, there was an increase in most
types of violent crime in the period after the
protests. In particular, shootings increased by
around 45 percent although gun-related crimes
8
The crimes composing this index include Reckless
Firearm Discharge and Battery–Aggravated: Handgun, etc.
We additionally consider an index using Shotspotter gunshot
detection data. We find a low correlation in our data between
it and other measures of gun crime and so focus here on
these other measures

rose by a much more modest 7 percent. Given
that an increase in shootings may correspond to
an increase in the gun carrying rate, this change
could drive the increased hit rates.
To investigate whether a change in gun carry
rates drove the increase in hit rates, we estimate
the change in hit rates for a subset of the city where
shootings did not increase significantly. The eight
police sectors chosen comprise an almost contiguous subset of the city representing roughly half
of the police stops. The change in crime following the protests in this subset of Chicago can be
seen in Table 2, columns 3–4. Here the changes
in gun related crimes and shootings in particular were much smaller in magnitude (only ~5.5
percent for each) and statistically insignificant.
Despite this, the increase in the hit rate for guns is
larger than the city overall—a 48 percent increase
relative to the pre-protest mean in this area (see
column 2 of Table 3).
A related concern is that there was a lot of
crime committed close to protests. This could
allow for much higher hit rates for frisks conducted at protest sites. To test this, in columns
3–4 of Table 3 we exclude a period of two weeks
after the first protest during which most of the
protests occurred. We find similar results to the
main specification confirming the results are not
driven by high hit rates during the protest activities themselves.
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Table 3—Pedestrian Frisk Hit Rate Robustness Tests
Subset of Chicago
All contraband
Guns only
(1)
(2)

After × Treat
After
Observations
Adjusted R2
Mean Y

Excluding first two weeks
after protests began
All contraband
Guns only
(3)
(4)

0.064
(0.028)

0.039
(0.021)

0.043
(0.018)

0.028
(0.013)

−0.012
(0.012)

−0.006
(0.006)

−0.025
(0.011)

−0.0020
(0.006)

9,432
0.016
0.120

9,432
0.026
0.034

18,132
0.015
0.110

18,132
0.016
0.028

Notes: This table reports the change in hit rate of pedestrian frisks using the specification in equation (1). In columns 1 and 2,
the data is restricted to frisks occurring in districts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, and 22. Columns 3 and 4 include frisks from all districts.
Hit rate is measured as the probability of finding either (1) any contraband or (2) specifically firearms following a search/frisk.
Data from 2 016–2020 are used. In all specifications, observations start from three weeks before the start of the George Floyd
protests on May 29. In columns 1 and 2, the six weeks beginning May 29 are used. In columns 3 and 4, the six weeks after June
11 are used with the days of protest in between excluded. The same calendar dates are used for all years. “After” equals 1 beginning on the calendar day of the first day of the relevant event and 0 otherwise; “Treat” equals 1 for 2020 and 0 otherwise. All
regressions include sector and year fixed effects as well as a time trend. Robust standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
Source: Chicago Police Department (2021)

III. Discussion

IV. Conclusion

Perhaps the biggest outstanding concern is
that gun carry rates may have increased sharply
after the protests and this is responsible for the
increased hit rates. In Section IIC, we presented
results of additional tests we ran to attempt to
rule out this possibility. In the absence of a
direct measure of gun carry rates, one cannot
fully rule out a sharp change, but all the evidence assembled indicates this is unlikely to
be the sole reason for the abrupt growth in hit
rates.
It is worth emphasizing the magnitude of the
hit rate response to the large decline in frisks.
In Chicago, a 39 percent decline in frisks corresponded to a 44.5 percent increase in the pedestrian firearm hit rate. This translates to only a
0.30 percent increase in the number of guns
recovered for a 1 percent increase in frisks. The
change in hit rate with respect to frisks is directly
related to the second derivative of the gun
detection–frisks relationship. To make optimal
policy decisions with respect to police frisks,
one needs to know not only the hit rate, which is
easy to compute, but information about the second derivative, which has not been previously
explored.

The role of race in policing is a topic that
recurs with increasing force and urgency, and
we attempt to add to our understanding of it.
We take advantage of the drastic reductions in
pedestrian frisks following the nationwide protests. We provide empirical corroboration of
the salient predictions of economic models of
police behavior: the contraband hit rate should
rise when the number of frisks per officer falls,
ceteris paribus.
Importantly, we rule out a number of alternative explanations. While an increase in the hit rate
is implied by both the KPT and Anwar and Fang
models, given the short time frame, we believe
it is unlikely to be driven purely by a change
in pedestrian behavior in response to the lower
detection probability. Hence our results appear to
favor the model of Anwar and Fang (2006).
Our findings have important implications for
potential reforms to improve policing. First,
policing is a very noisy process, where the vast
majority of the frisks do not result in contraband
findings. Second, despite the noisy policing process, the findings in our paper also suggest that
police behavior is broadly consistent with models where they aim to at least partly maximize
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the contraband-finding rates, using the noisy and
imperfect signals they have at the time of making their decisions.
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